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EVERY STORY HAS A BEGINNING, MIDDLE, AND AN END (BUT NOT
ALWAYS IN THAT ORDER): PREDICTING DURATION DYNAMICS IN A
UNIFIED FRAMEWORK
DAINA CHIBA, NILS W. METTERNICH, AND MICHAEL D. WARD
Abstract. There are three fundamental duration dynamics of civil conflicts: Time until conflict
onset, conflict duration, and time until conflict recurrence. Theoretical and empirical models of war
usually focus on one or at most two aspects of these three important duration dynamics. We argue
that duration forecasting of conflict needs to incorporate all three conflict dynamics as unobserved
factors might impact on all three of these dynamics. We present a new split-population seemingly-
unrelated duration estimator that treats pre-conflict duration, conflict duration, and post-conflict
duration as interdependent processes thus permitting improved predictions about the onset, dura-
tion, and recurrence of civil conflict. Our findings provide support for the more fundamental idea
that prediction is dependent on a good approximation of the theoretically implied underlying data
generating process. In addition, we account for the fact that some countries might never experience
these duration dynamics or become immune after experiencing them in the past.
1. Introduction
The end of fighting cannot be equated with eternal peace. As illustrated in Figure 1, 63 percent
of civil conflicts recur1 and we know that a history of armed conflict makes recurrence even more
likely (Walter, 2004). In the long run we can therefore observe multiple peace and armed conflict
spells with varying durations in one and the same conflict (Kreutz, 2010). Just reviewing this
simple empirical insight already raises the main question of this paper: What is the extent to which
pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict durations depend on each other? Only recently, scholars are
taking seriously the notion that peace and armed conflict durations are interdependent processes
that require detailed theoretical and empirical attention (Reed, 2000; Wagner, 2000; Filson and
Werner, 2002; Wucherpfennig, 2011). However, most empirical efforts to identify the causes of pre-
conflict, conflict, and post-conflict durations typically investigate the phases of peace (i.e., survival
of peace until conflict breaks out) and the phases of conflict (survival of conflict until peace resumes)
as two unrelated, isolated processes (Collier, Hoeﬄer and Soderbom, 2004; Walter, 2004; Hegre and
Sambanis, 2006; Quinn, Mason and Gurses, 2007; Balch-Lindsay, Enterline and Joyce, 2008). In
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1This percentage is calculated for the period between 1946 and 2004 with the conflict data from the Uppsala Conflict
Data Project.
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this paper, we argue that peace (pre- and post-conflict) and conflict durations are interdependent,
but highlight that there might be conditions under which actors decide never to fight. For example,
if actors expect very high costs of conflict, we never observe a conflict period. Thus, we have to
differentiate between (1) peace spells that are actually at risk of conflict and (2) peace durations that
are virtually immune to conflict. We show that a substantial increase in forecasting performance
of conflict and post-conflict duration can be achieved by taking into account all aspects of the
theoretically implied data generating process.
Figure 1. Conflict Recurrence Over Time, 1946–2004
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Note: This figure shows the frequency of conflict recurrence based on the UCDP data set. The height of the bars
shows the number of civil conflicts terminated in a given year. The light gray bars show the number of terminated
conflicts that have not recurred by the end of 2004, and the black bars show the number of terminated conflicts that
have recurred by the end of 2004.
Our main contribution is to introduce a split-population interdependent duration estimator that
captures the theoretically implied unobserved interdependence between the durations of pre-conflict
peace, conflict, and post-conflict peace. A major goal of this paper is to expand on the current
literature that predominantly treats peace and conflict processes as independent (Walter, 2009;
Blattman and Miguel, 2010). Theoretical and empirical research on the determinants of conflict
onset (pre-conflict duration) is well developed and probably represents the largest share of existing
civil conflict literature (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier, Hoeﬄer and Soderbom, 2004; Hegre and
Sambanis, 2006). While not to the same extent, also our knowledge about conflict durations has
greatly expanded in recent years and many factors have been identified that impact on the decisions
to continue or end fighting (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, 2000; Fearon, 2004; Cunningham, 2006).
Finally, scholars have been well aware of the fact that it is important to understand the conditions
under which conflicts recur and have explored post-conflict durations both theoretically and em-
pirically (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003; Fortna, 2003; Walter, 2004; Werner and Yuen, 2005; Chiba,
2014).
Despite the important contributions analyzing conflict and peace durations independently, less
research is considering conflict and peace durations as interdependent processes (Hays and Kachi,
2011). While some significant contributions have been made that point to the importance of en-
dogenous processes in conflicts (Reed, 2000; Boehmke, Morey and Shannon, 2006; Wucherpfennig,
2011), the more general conflict literature has not fully embraced the consequences of these duration
interdependencies. In addition, when scholars address endogenous conflict processes they focus on
the “dyadic duration” interdependence. This means these studies either focus on the relationship
between (a) pre-conflict peace and fighting or (b) fighting and post-conflict peace. Naturally, this
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Table 1. Existing duration studies and limitations in the amount of information considered
Study types Duration information considered Examples
Onset studies
︸ ︷︷ ︸ Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998)
Y1 =Pre-conflict peace ∆ Carter and Signorino (2010)
Duration studies
︸ ︷︷ ︸ Fearon (2004)
Y1 =Conflict ∆ Cunningham et al. (2009)
Recurrence studies
︸ ︷︷ ︸ Fortna (2004)
Y1 =Post-conflict peace ∆ Werner and Yuen (2005)
Selection/Split studies
︸ ︷︷ ︸ ︸ ︷︷ ︸ Shannon, Morey and Boehmke (2010)
Y1 =Pre-conflict peace ∆ Y2 =Conflict ∆ Reed (2000)
Interdependent studies
︸ ︷︷ ︸ ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Y1 =Conflict ∆ Y2 =Post-conflict peace ∆ Wucherpfennig (2011)
Unifying studies
︸ ︷︷ ︸ ︸ ︷︷ ︸ ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Y1 =Pre-conflict peace ∆ Y2 =Conflict ∆ Y1 =Post-conflict peace ∆ Our SPDDD estimator
brings along a sample selection issue. For example, if we take into account the interdependence
between conflict duration and post-conflict peace duration, we only allow cases into our sample that
have actually experienced conflict. There are many approaches that might take care of the selection
effect or split-sample that we might be facing. However, the problem with existing approaches is that
they take care of selection-duration and split-duration processes, but do not allow us to model what
we think is the underlying data generating process: a split-population duration-duration process.
Consider Table 1 illustrating our three-duration concepts (pre-conflict peace, conflict, and post-
conflict peace). Studies that explain conflict onset usually focus on pre-conflict peace and, depending
on the research design, may also treat recurrence periods as pre-conflict spells. That implies that
any information on conflict duration is not considered. In addition, peace spells are treated as inde-
pendent and identically distributed (I.I.D.) and therefore possible interdependence is not considered.
This is especially problematic when studies include conflicts with recurrent fighting and peace pat-
terns, because they are likely to be linked to one another. Similarly, studies that focus on conflict
duration treat fighting spells as independent from peace spells. A few studies have looked at “dyadic
duration” dependence, that is allowing for interdependence between either pre-conflict peace spells
and conflict spells or conflict spells and post-conflict peace spells (Reed, 2000; Boehmke, Morey
and Shannon, 2006; Wucherpfennig, 2011). However, each of these empirical approaches does not
utilize all observed information. This is the limitation that this paper addresses.
While the empirical assessment of armed conflicts has sidelined interdependent durations, the
theoretical literature is well aware of this relationship. Recent formal work on organized violence
has conceptualized the onset, continuation, termination, and recurrence of wars as an interrelated
bargaining process (Filson and Werner, 2002; Leventoglu and Slantchev, 2007; Powell, 2004; Wagner,
2000). But even though the scholarly community has made considerable progress in developing
detailed datasets on various aspects of conflict dynamics over the past decades,2 the analytical and
predictive tools available to the empirical researchers have not yet caught up with the developments
in current conflict theories.
We propose a new empirical approach to studying phases of peace and conflict in a single, unified
framework. We do so by extending the existing techniques of survival analysis. Survival analysis
(also called event history analysis, hazard analysis, or duration analysis) has become a widely-used
tool for the analyst of political events (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 2001). This approach enables
the researcher to model the risks of a political event (e.g., conflict, democratization, leadership
2See, for example, the Correlates of War (COW) project and Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP).
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change) as a time dependent process. Survival analysis recognizes that the risk of event happening
depends on how long the subject has survived previously without experiencing the event of interest.
In the sense that one can interpret any binary time-series cross-sectional models as an application
of survival analysis (Beck, Katz and Tucker, 1998; Carter and Signorino, 2010), survival analysis is
arguably the single most predominant mode of analysis in conflict research. Scholars of international
and civil conflict have utilized the technique of survival analysis to study the duration of conflict
(i.e., conflict termination) (e.g., Balch-Lindsay, Enterline and Joyce, 2008; Bennett and Stam, 1998,
1996; Bueno de Mesquita, Koch and Siverson, 2004; Cunningham et al., 2009; Fearon, 2004; Glass-
myer and Sambanis, 2008; Goemans, 2000; Krustev, 2006; Langlois and Langlois, 2009; Ramsay,
2008; Regan and Stam, 2000; Shannon, Morey and Boehmke, 2010; Slantchev, 2004; Stanley and
Sawyer, 2009) and the durability of peace after and/or before conflict (i.e., conflict onset and recur-
rence) (e.g., Fortna, 2003, 2004; Gibler and Tir, 2010; Glassmyer and Sambanis, 2008; Grieco, 2001;
Lo, Hashimoto and Reiter, 2008; Quackenbush and Venteicher, 2008; Senese and Quackenbush,
2003; Tir, 2003; Werner, 1999; Werner and Yuen, 2005).
Although some efforts have been made to investigate the connection between survival of peace and
survival of conflict (e.g., Shannon, Morey and Boehmke, 2010; Wucherpfennig, 2011), little research
has been undertaken to look at the whole life span of conflict in a coherent framework. We offer
an approach to predict the onset, termination, and recurrence of violent conflict in a unified model.
In so doing, we present a new statistical model that estimates three consecutive duration processes
jointly. Our estimation strategy is a split-population seemingly-unrelated duration approach, where
we simultaneously estimate whether countries are at risk of experiencing an armed conflict, the
pre-conflict peace duration, the conflict duration, and the post-conflict duration. Hence, it is a
split-population duration-duration-duration (SPDDD) framework. We conduct empirical analyses
of armed conflicts using data from the Uppsala Conflict Project over the period from 1946 to 2004.
We propose three major contributions. First, we provide a theoretical argument that implies
unobservable factors that impact on the interdependence between pre-conflict peace, conflict, and
post-conflict peace. Second, we propose a new approach to take full advantage of the information
available in typical conflict data. By jointly estimating the duration of peace and the duration
of conflict, our approach is more efficient and has a better predictive ability. This approach also
facilitates stochastic simulation of the ebb and flow of conflict across the globe. Finally, we provide
and apply a generic statistical model that implements our proposed framework in the context of the
study of civil wars. Although the statistical model is originally developed to capture our theoretical
insight about recurring violent conflict, it can readily be applied to studying other interesting polit-
ical events. Potential applications of this model include democratic cycling (democratic transition
and authoritarian reversal), leadership change in two-party system, among others.
2. The past is the present is the past: Interdependent peace and conflict
durations
Unobserved or unmeasurable factors are likely to play an important role in determining peace
and conflict duration. At least from a theoretical perspective this is certainly true. For example,
bargaining models of war assume that information (Slantchev, 2003), power-shifts (Powell, 2012),
fighting costs (Schultz, 2001), or resolve (Morrow, 1989) drive decisions to begin and end fighting.
For instance, individual government leaders might have differing levels of resolve that impacts on
peace and conflict duration. But not only unobserved leader characteristics are likely to matter for
conflict and peace durations. Certain conflicts might be more likely subject to rapid power shifts due
to unobserved external support for rebel organizations, which again impacts on conflict and peace
duration. Furthermore, some governments and rebel organizations might be more or less patient,
which is unobservable but important for bargaining dynamics of war and peace. This means many
of the theoretically important factors might not be measurable at all or only to a certain extent.
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The idea that unobservables influence multiple political processes is hardly new. For example,
Boehmke (2006) demonstrates that unobserved and unobservable factors influence both the timing
and contents of positions taken by legislators. In addition, Glasgow, Golder and Golder (2012)
demonstrate that government formation processes depend heavily on unobservable factors. However,
the unobserved/unobservable factors that impact on both peace and conflict duration have received
little theoretical attention. This appears strange since peace and conflict are inherently related
to each other: Peace is interrupted by conflict and conflict is interrupted by peace. We develop
a theoretical argument that highlights how a set of unobservable factors that are related to the
bargaining environment of actors result in interdependent conflict and peace durations.
2.1. Enduring peace: Immunity from conflict. Before turning to our argument about duration
interdependencies, we want to differentiate between two different peace bargaining situations. (1)
Instances where actors are satisfied with the status quo and (2) situation in which at least one actor
is unsatisfied with the current state. When actors are satisfied with the status quo, the risk of
conflict is theoretically zero. We should not see any fighting, either because the costs of fighting are
too high, or the division of the contentious good is according to the underlying power distribution.
In such a situation neither side can credibly threaten the other side with the outside option of war
and the actors are in a sense “immune” to conflict. Note that actors can be satisfied with the status
quo before or after a conflict period. For example, it might be the case that actors actually resolve
the contentious issue after some periods of fighting and enter enduring peace (e.g. American Civil
War). The existing literature points to several factors that make it more likely that actors are
satisfied with the status quo. High economic development is usually associated with the idea that
opportunity costs are too high to engage in conflict and actors are more likely to be satisfied with
the status quo (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). Democratic societies allow political participation and
changes to the status quo without violent means. This allows dissatisfied actors to address their
political grievances without resorting to violence. However, stable autocracies can impose high
costs for violence and successfully repress opposition forces. This means that so-called “anocracies”
should be least immune to conflict (Hegre et al., 2001). But not only institutional factors should
contribute to the immunity of conflict. Polices of ethnic exclusion are likely to contribute to the fact
that the underlying power relationship is not reflected by the political status of individual groups
(Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010). Ultimately, this will lead to unsatisfied actors that reduce
the immunity from conflict.
Proposition 1: When actors are satisfied with the status quo, they are immune
from conflict.
2.2. Unstable peace: At risk of conflict and underlying interdependencies. Having ad-
dressed the conditions under which peace endures, we are left with “at risk” cases where actors are
unsatisfied with the status quo and/or beliefs are not convergence. These are situation in which
we should see actual crisis bargaining (before conflict) and conflict bargaining (during fighting). To
attain some propositions of how peace duration and conflict duration are related in the context of
these at risk cases we consider an informational account of bargaining.
Let us consider two actors in a crisis bargaining situation with incomplete information. Leventoğlu
and Tarar (2008) give a theoretical account of how the duration of crisis bargaining depends on the
patience of the dissatisfied actor. Only in crisis bargaining situations in which the dissatisfied actor
is highly patient will long bargaining periods occur. Hence, when a dissatisfied actor values future
payoffs, she will wait a long time until an agreement is achieved. Taking the argument of Leventoğlu
and Tarar (2008) a bit further, what will happen once the patient dissatisfied actor finds herself
in a fighting period? Since the patient actor values future payoffs highly, she would not want to
continue fighting for very long. The unsatisfied actor should accept an offer after a short period of
fighting. Following this line of reasoning that the length of crisis bargaining is driven by the patience
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of dissatisfied actors, we propose that long periods of crisis bargaining are followed by short periods
of fighting.
Proposition 2: Long periods of crisis bargaining are followed by short periods of
fighting.
However, the pattern of short peace and conflict durations, and especially recurrent conflict, does
not need to arise from the information asymmetry. An alternative account is developed by Powell
(2012) where shifts in the underlying power distribution can lead to recurrent patterns of conflict.
The rate of these changes will impact the length of fighting and peace spells. Again, unobservable
factors drive both peace and conflict durations.
3. A split-population duration-duration-duration model
The empirical implications of this paper are tested by implementing a split-population model
that uses seemingly-unrelated durations. The seemingly-unrelated duration part of the estimator
takes into account the theoretically implied endogeneity between peace and conflict duration. The
split-population part of the model takes into account that there may be unobserved heterogeneity
between countries in regard to their predisposition to experience any armed conflict. Hence, there
might be some units that are more or less “immune” to initial or recurring conflict and therefore
cannot be described by a duration process that assumes that every unit will experience initial or
renewed conflict.
We provide Figure 2 to illustrate why it is important to similarly account for strategic indepen-
dence and the immunity of units. Let us assume that we can observe some units (e.g., country)
over some observation span (e.g., 67 years if our data run from 1946 through 2004). Let us further
assume that, at any given point in time, a unit is in either one of two states: peace or in conflict.
Survival analysis (also called event history analysis or duration analysis) treats these units as a series
of observations that are “at risk” of an event at every point in time until they experience it. In the
first two cases (Figure 2: A1 and A2) the assumption of “at risk” is correct. In case A1 the unit is
at peace during the observation period and the peace spell also ends within the observation period.
For A2 the assumption of “at risk” also applies even though the end of the peace spell (failure) is
outside of our observation period. This is generally called a right-censored observation. However,
for the case of A3 the assumption of “at risk” is not met. It will actually never experience failure
(conflict) because it is immune. Therefore, we need a split-population framework to differentiate
between cases like A1/2 and A3.
However, we not only observe peace spells (A1−A3) but also peace and conflict spells (B1−B2).
In cases B1−B2 the “at risk” assumption holds for both peace and conflict spells because we do not
allow for infinite conflict. Two types of events are of our interest here: when a country is currently
in peace, then the country is at risk of conflict onset; when the country is currently in conflict,
then it is at risk of conflict termination. If a country in one state (peace or conflict) continues to
be in the same state by the end of the time unit, we say the country “survives” the time unit. On
the other hand, if a country experiences a transition from one state to the other during a time
unit t, we say the country experiences a failure at t. In example B1, we observe the full length of
the peace (black) and conflict spell (grey), while in B2 the conflict spell is right-censored but will
fail eventually. Thus the main challenge here is not the “immunity” of units but the theoretically
implied interdependency between peace and conflict duration.
Finally, we move to examples C1−C3 in Figure 2. They provide a somewhat realistic picture of
recurring peace and conflict spells. In the case of C1, we can observe a peace spell, a conflict spell,
and a post-conflict peace spell that fails within the observation period. Our theoretical argument
proposed that all three spells should be interdependent. This also applies to the cases of C2 and
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Figure 2. Conflict data and the differentiation between non-censored, censored, and
immune peace spells (black spells). Grey lines represent non-censored and censored
conflict spells
Peace (2x) and conflict spells (C3)
Peace (2x) and conflict spells (C2)
Peace (2x) and conflict spells (C1)
Peace and conflict spells (B2)
Peace and conflict spells (B1)
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Peace spell (A2)
Peace spell (A1)
Non−censored
Censored
Immune
Non−censored Non−censored
Non−censored Censored
Non−censored Non−censored Non−censored
Non−censored Non−censored Censored
Non−censored Non−censored Immune
Observation Period
C3. The main difference between C2 and C3 is that the later case will not revert back to conflict
in the future. It is in a sense cured from conflict and will not fail. Thus we have to differentiate
between cases C2 where the “at risk” assumption holds and C3 which violates it.
We thus propose a new empirical framework that allows us to utilize more information contained
in the data. We do so by constructing a likelihood function that takes into account the duration
of preceding conflict (peace) spells in calculating the duration of peace (conflict) spells. Moreover,
our proposed model also accommodates the split-population technique that estimates the latent
probability that a country is “immune” from conflict. This technique, recently introduced to political
scientists (e.g., Svolik, 2008), is particularly suitable for analyzing conflict data that typically contain
long periods of no conflict. We derive this model in several steps. We first introduce simple
survival models for peace and conflict duration. We then introduce the joint duration model that
simultaneously estimates peace and conflict duration. Finally we present a model that jointly
estimates the probability of immunity, as well as peace and conflict duration.
For each of the three models, we present a general model that allows time-varying covariates. That
is, in all of our expositions below, the values of the covariates are allowed to vary within a spell. We
do so by splitting each spell into shorter observation periods (e.g., year) such that the values of the
covariates are constant within periods but not across periods. Let j = 1, · · · Js index the observation
period within a spell s, where there are Js periods. Let ts,j denote the cumulative duration at period
j, where ts,Js is the total duration of spell s. We evaluate the likelihood contributions for each period
rather than for each spell.
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Part 1: Simple Duration Model. In the standard analysis of peace duration, the likelihood
contribution from a unit-period observation that experiences peace survival at time period j is
characterized as a conditional probability that peace survives the period j, given peace has survived
up to j − 1, or
Pr(TPs > t
P
s,j | TPs > tPs,j−1) =
Pr(TPs > t
P
s,j ∩ TPs > tPs,j−1)
Pr(TPs > t
P
s,j−1)
(1)
=
Pr(TPs > t
P
s,j)
Pr(TPs > t
P
s,j−1)
where TPs is a random variable that represents the duration of peace spell for s and tPs,j is the
cumulative duration of peace for s observed at period j. We treat the observation period j as
right-censored (even though the spell s may not be ultimately right-censored at a later period
j′ > j).
On the other hand, the likelihood contribution from an observation that does experience peace
failure at period j is given as:
Pr(TPs = t
P
s,j | TPs > tPs,j−1) =
Pr(TPs = t
P
s,j ∩ TPs > tPs,j−1)
Pr(TPs > t
P
s,j−1)
(2)
=
Pr(TPs = t
P
s,j)
Pr(TPs > t
P
s,j−1)
.
We then obtain the total likelihood contributions from all the observations in peace spells using the
following likelihood function:
LP ∝
∏[ Pr(TPs > tPs,j)
Pr(TPs > t
P
s,j−1)
](rj=1) [
Pr(TPs = t
P
s,j)
Pr(TPs > t
P
s,j−1)
](rj=0)
,(3)
where rj is the (period-level) right-censoring indicator that takes a value of 1 for right-censored
periods and 0 for non-censored periods.
To further characterize the likelihood function (3), we specify the probability distribution for the
duration variable.3 Using the flexible Weibull specification,4 for example, the density function f(·)
and the survivor function S(·) are each given as a function of the scale parameter λ and the shape
parameter α, as follows:5
Pr(T = t) = λα (λt)(α−1) exp (−(λt)α) ≡ f(t)(4)
Pr(T > t) = exp (− (λt)α) ≡ S(t).
The shape parameter determines whether the risk of “failure” event (i.e., conflict onset) is increasing
(α > 1), decreasing (α < 1), or constant (α = 1) over analysis time. We allow the duration of peace
to be conditioned on vectors of time-varying covariates, XPsj . We do so by specifying the scale
parameter governing the durations as λPsj = exp(−XPsjβP ), where βP is the vector of coefficient
parameters.
3There are several different ways to represent a parametric duration model. We follow the parametrization presented
in a standard textbook (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004)).
4We choose Weibull specification here for the purpose of illustration. Analysts can choose other parametric speci-
fications, such as log-logistic specification. We will come back to the issue of model specification in the section on
empirical application.
5We only show the density and survival functions here, but one can easily characterize some auxiliary functions from
these two, such as the distribution function F (t) = 1− S(t) or hazard function h(t) = f(t
S(t)
.
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This model takes into account how long peace has survived previously in calculating the likelihood
of peace survival and peace failure for each period in the data. It represents a typical duration model
employed in the prevalent quantitative studies of conflict onset.6 We can also write down a typical
model of conflict duration in a similar manner:
LC ∝
∏[Pr(TCs > tCs,j)
Pr(TCs > t
C
s,j)
](rj=1) [
Pr(TCs = t
C
s,j)
Pr(TCs > t
C
s,j)
](rj=0)
,(5)
where TCs is a random variable that represents the duration of conflict for spell s and tCs,j is the
cumulative duration of conflict for s observed at period j.
It should be clear from these expositions that a conventional model of peace duration (3) only
utilizes information from those observations where conflict is not already ongoing (i.e., cases A1 and
A2 in Figure 2), whereas a conventional model of conflict duration (5) focuses only on observations
where conflict is already ongoing. If we believe that peace and conflict spells are interdependent, a
separate estimation of equations (3) and (5) is inefficient as each model discards information utilized
in the other model. In what follows, we present a seemingly-unrelated duration model that allows
us to estimate these two processes jointly. This is a stepping stone to our proposed SPDDD model.
Part 2: Joint Model of Pre-conflict Peace, Conflict, and Post-conflict Peace Duration.
The model we present below takes into account the duration of the preceding spells as well as the
duration of the present spell up to the observation period. In other words, the duration of post-
conflict peace at period j is formulated as a function of its survival up to j−1 as well as the duration
of the conflict that precedes it. In this sense, the model is a seemingly-unrelated duration model.
Let TC′s denote a random variable representing the duration of conflict spell for s that precedes
the current peace spell and tC′s denote a realization of its value. Then, the likelihood contribution
from a post-conflict peace observation that experiences peace survival at period j is characterized
as a conditional probability that peace survives j given peace has survived up to j − 1 and the
previous conflict has a duration tC′s , or
Pr
[
TPs > t
P
s,j | (TPs > tPs,j−1 ∩ TC
′
s = t
C′
s )
]
=
Pr(TPs > t
P
s,j ∩ TPs > tPs,j−1 ∩ TC
′
s = t
C′
s )
Pr(TPs > t
P
s,j−1 ∩ TC′s = tC′s )
(6)
=
Pr(TPs > t
P
s,j ∩ TC
′
s = t
C′
s )
Pr(TPs > t
P
s,j−1 ∩ TC′s = tC′s )
.
Similarly, the likelihood contribution from an observation that experiences peace failure at period
j is given as
Pr
[
TPs = t
P
s,j | (TPs > tPs,j−1 ∩ TC
′
s = t
C′
s )
]
=
Pr(TPs = t
P
s,j ∩ TPs > tPs,j−1 ∩ TC
′
s = t
C′
s )
Pr(TPs = t
P
s,j−1 ∩ TC′s = tC′s )
(7)
=
Pr(TPs = t
P
s,j ∩ TC
′
s = t
C′
s )
Pr(TPs > t
P
s,j−1 ∩ TC′s = tC′s )
.
In addition, we specify the likelihood contribution from conflict observations at period j as a function
of the preceding peace duration as well as the survival of conflict up to period j−1. Let TP ′s denote
a random variable representing the duration of peace for s that precedes the current conflict and tP ′s
6It is true that there is a variation among conflict studies in terms of the observation unit (e.g., country, dyad, directed
dyad), the period-unit (e.g., year, month, or entire spell), and parametric specification of the duration dependence.
Nevertheless, any statistical models of conflict onset can be expressed as model (3) with some adjustment.
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denote its observed value, then we have the following likelihood function that calculates the total
likelihood of the data:
L ∝
∏[ Pr(TPs > tPs,j)
Pr(TPs > t
P
s,j−1)
](rj=1) [
Pr(TPs = t
P
s,j)
Pr(TPs > t
P
s,j−1)
](rj=0)
(8)
[
Pr(TCs,j > t
C
s,j ∩ TP
′
s = t
P ′
s )
Pr(TCs > t
C
s,j ∩ TP ′s = tP ′s )
](rj=1) [
Pr(TCs,j = t
C
s,j ∩ TP
′
s = t
P ′
s )
Pr(TCs > t
C
s,j ∩ TP ′s = tP ′s )
](rj=0)
[
Pr(TPs > t
P
s,j ∩ TC
′
s = t
C′
s )
Pr(TPs > t
P
s,j−1 ∩ TC′s = tC′s )
](rj=1) [
Pr(TPs = t
P
s,j ∩ TC
′
s = t
C′
s )
Pr(TPs > t
P
s,j−1 ∩ TC′s = tC′s )
](rj=0)
.
The first line in the likelihood function (8) calculates the likelihood contribution from pre-conflict
peace spells, the second line from the conflict spells, and the last line from post-conflict peace spells.
A challenge in estimating the likelihood function (8) is to characterize two types of joint distri-
butions that appear in the likelihood function (8), namely Pr(TA > tA ∩ TB = tB) and Pr(TA =
tA∩TB = tB) with (A,B) ∈ {(P,C ′), (C,P ′)}. If the two random variables we have were each Nor-
mally distributed, the joint distribution of the two would simply be a bivariate Normal. However,
both TA and TB represent duration, which we would want to model with a non-Normal distribution
such as Weibull, log-logistic, or generalized gamma. It is not straightforward to characterize a joint
distribution whose marginal distributions are not Normal. To deal with this challenge, we utilize
a copula function and derive a new joint distribution from the two duration variables. A copula
is a function that binds together two or more univariate marginal distributions of known form to
produce a new joint distribution (Trivedi and Zimmer, 2005). Scholars have used copula functions
to construct models of multiple duration processes (Hays and Kachi, 2011; Quiroz Flores, 2013),
selection models for duration (Boehmke, Morey and Shannon, 2006; Chiba, Martin and Stevenson,
2014), and joint models of duration and ordered or count variable (Fukumoto, 2013; Chiba, 2014).
Consider two random variables X and Y with associated univariate distribution functions FX(·)
and FY (·). Sklar’s (1959) theorem establishes that there exists a copula C( ·, · ; θ) such that a
bivariate joint distribution is defined for all x and y in the extended real line as
FXY (x, y) = Pr(X < x ∩ Y < y) = C
(
FX(x), FY (y); θ
)
(9)
where the association parameter, θ, represents the degree of interdependence between the x and y.
This result is remarkable because it shows that we can construct a new bivariate distribution based
on univariate marginal distributions of known form. As long as the univariate marginal distributions
are known, an appropriate choice of copula function C(·) in (9) enables us to represent the unknown
bivariate distribution. Moreover, we can also characterize the density function and the conditional
distribution functions using a copula, as follows
fXY (x, y) = Pr(X = x ∩ Y = y) =
∂C
(
FX(x), FY (y); θ
)
∂x ∂y
(10)
=
∂C
(
FX(x), FY (y); θ
)
∂FX(x) ∂FY (y)
· fX(x) · fY (y)
fX|Y (x, y) = Pr(X = x|Y = y) =
Pr(X = x ∩ Y = y)
Pr(Y = y)
=
fXY (x, y)
fY (y)
FX|Y (x, y) = Pr(X < x|Y = y) =
∫ x
−∞
fX|Y (x, y)
where fX(·) and fY (·) are the univariate density functions for X and Y .
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With these functions, we can thus specify the first type of joint probability in (8) as
Pr(TA > tA ∩ TB = tB) = Pr(TB = tB)− Pr(TA < tA ∩ TB = tB)(11)
= Pr(TB = tB) ·
[
1− Pr(T
A < tA ∩ TB = tB)
Pr(TB = tB)
]
= Pr(TB = tB) · [1− Pr(TA < tA|TB = tB)]
= fY (t
B) · [1− FX|Y (tA, tB)]
where f(·) is the density function for duration (e.g., Weibull as defined in (4)). The second type of
joint probability in (8) is obtained simply as
Pr(TA = tA ∩ TB = tB) = fXY (tA, tB).(12)
To complete the derivation, the last step is to choose a particular copula function for C(, ; θ) to
characterize functions in (9) and (10). There are a number of different copula functions that can
be used to construct a multivariate distribution from univariate marginals (Trivedi and Zimmer,
2005), but some copulas are more flexible than others in that they can accommodate greater range
of dependency between the marginals. In this study, we use the Gaussian copula, one of the most
flexible copula functions that can accommodate both positive and negative dependency. It has the
following form
C(u, v; θ) =
∫ Φ−1(u)
−∞
∫ Φ−1(v)
−∞
1
2pi(1− θ2)1/2 exp
[−(s2 − 2θst+ t2)
2(1− θ2)
]
dsdt
where Φ−1() is the Gaussian quantile function, −1 < θ < 1 is the association parameter, and
u = Fx(x) and v = Fy(y) for random variables x and y. With the Gaussian copula, the density and
the conditional functions in (10) have the following forms:
fXY (x, y) = (1− θ2)− 12 exp
[
−1
2
(1− θ2)−1(a2 + b2 − 2θab)
]
exp
[
1
2
(a2 + b2)
]
· fX(x) · fY (y)(13)
FX|Y (x, y) =
∫ a
−∞
fXY (x, y) = Φ
(
a− θb√
1− θ2
)
where a = Φ−1
(
FX(x)
)
, b = Φ−1
(
FY (y)
)
, and Φ(·) is the standard Normal distribution function.
The Gaussian copula has a number of desirable characteristics. First, it allows for independence
as a special case (θ = 0). We can thus test the existence of interdependence between the two
processes by testing whether θ is different from 0. Second, the Gaussian copula is comprehensive
in that as θ approaches the lower (upper) bound of its permissible range, the copula approaches
the theoretical lower (upper) bound.7 Third, the derivation of the conditional functions in (10) is
straightforward with the Gaussian copula.
Bringing it together: A Split-population SUD model. We further extend this joint model by
incorporating the split-population technique that allows us to split the observations into those that
are “immune” from conflict and those that are not. This technique has been developed in medical
research where researchers are interested in identifying those patients that are cured of a disease of
interest (and hence not at risk of death from the said disease) and those that are still at risk. When
a patient dies of the disease at a given period, researchers know with certainty that the patient has
not been cured of the disease. When a patient survives a given period, however, one must consider
two possibilities: the patient is cured of the disease of interest, or the patient is not cured but
7The upper and lower theoretical bounds of a joint distribution, called Fre´chet bounds, F− and F+, are defined as
F−(u, v) = max[0, u+ v − 1] and F+(u, v) = min[u, v].
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his/her time has not come at the period yet. Since “cure” is unobservable, a split-population model
estimates the latent probability that a patient is cured or not.
We apply this technique to the study of peace and conflict by specifying the probability that a
country is “immune” from conflict. In the context of conflict research, we can think of immunity as
the absence of issues to fight over. According to the bargaining perspective, parties with potential
issues to fight over (i.e., those that are not immune from conflict) can nevertheless avoid war if
they can agree to a bargain that makes both sides better off than costly fighting. The disputants’
ability to find such mutually beneficial agreements, however, is severely constrained in the presence
of informational problems or commitment problems (Fearon, 1995; Powell, 2006). We would expect
that these problems generally grow over time, as there will be a greater chance that some exogenous
shocks create sources of the bargaining problem. It may be the case that one party’s military power
grows faster than that of the other disputing party, which creates dynamic commitment problems.
It may also be the case that the convergence of expectations with regard to the fighting capabilities
of one another get distorted, creating informational problems. As the bargaining problem grows
severer over time, the conditional risk of conflict onset given non-immunity should also grow over
time, whereas the risk of conflict onset remains zero for immune countries (those that do not have
issues to fight over in the first place). Split-population technique allows us to capture this dynamic
by estimating the likelihood of immunity and the conditional risk of conflict given non-immunity.
Let cs,j denote a binary indicator that takes the value of 1 whenever a country is “immune” from
conflict, and 0 if a country is at risk of conflict. Since we do not observe whether the right-censored
country-period observations s, j in the data are immune or not, cs,j is an unobservable variable.
When an observation in a peace spell survives period j, the country may be either totally immune
from conflict or non-immune (but its time has not come). Then, the likelihood contribution from
an observation that experiences peace survival at period j is a combination of the likelihood that
an observation is immune from conflict and the likelihood that an observation is not immune but
has not experienced conflict during that period. We can thus rewrite equation (6) as follows:
Pr
[
{cs,j = 1 ∪ (cs,j = 0 ∩ TPs > tPs,j)} | {cs,j = 1 ∪ (cs,j = 0 ∩ TPs > tPs,j−1 ∩ TC
′
s = t
C′
s )}
]
(14)
=
Pr[cs,j = 1 ∪ (cs,j = 0 ∩ TPs > tPs,j ∩ TC
′
s = t
C′
s )]
Pr[cs,j = 1 ∪ (cs,j = 0 ∩ TPs > tPs,j−1 ∩ TC′s = tC′s )]
=
Pr(cs,j = 1) + Pr(cs,j = 0) Pr[(T
P
s > t
P
s,j ∩ TC
′
s = t
C′
s )|cs,j = 0]
Pr(cs,j = 1) + Pr(cs,j = 0) Pr[(TPs > t
P
s,j−1 ∩ TC′s = tC′s )|cs,j = 0]
,
where Pr[(TPs > tPs,j ∩ TC
′
s = t
C′
s )|cs,j = 0] is the conditional joint probability of post-conflict peace
survival and conflict duration given non-immunity.
On the other hand, when an observation in a peace spell experiences conflict, the country must
be non-immune and cs,j = 0. To calculate the likelihood contribution from such an observation, we
rewrite equation (7) as follows:
Pr
[
cs,j = 0 ∩ TPs = tPs,j | {cs,j = 1 ∪ (cs,j = 0 ∩ TPs > tPs,j−1 ∩ TC
′
s = t
C′
s )}
]
(15)
=
Pr[cs,j = 0 ∩ TPs = tPs,j ∩ TC
′
s = t
C′
s ]
Pr[cs,j = 1 ∪ (cs,j = 0 ∩ TPs > tPs,j−1 ∩ TC′s = tC′s )]
=
Pr(cs,j = 0) Pr[(T
P
s = t
P
s,j ∩ TC
′
s = t
C′
s )|cs,j = 0]
Pr(cs,j = 1) + Pr(cs,j = 0) Pr[(TPs > t
P
s,j−1 ∩ TC′s = tC′s )|cs,j = 0]
.
where Pr[(TPs = tPs,j∩TC
′
s = t
C′
s )|cs,j = 0] is the conditional joint probability density of post-conflict
peace duration given non-immunity.
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Our proposed model thus has the following likelihood function:
L ∝
∏[ Pr(cs,j = 1) + Pr(cs,j = 0) Pr(TPs > tPs,j | cs,j = 0)
Pr(cs,j = 1) + Pr(cs,j = 0) Pr(TPs > t
P
s,j−1 | cs,j = 0)
](rj=1)
(16)
[
Pr(cs,j = 0) Pr(T
P
s = t
P
s,j | cs,j = 0)
Pr(cs,j = 1) + Pr(cs,j = 0) Pr(TPs > t
P
s,j−1 | cs,j = 0)
](rj=0)
[
Pr(TCs,j > t
C
s,j ∩ TP
′
s = t
P ′
s )
Pr(TCs > t
C
s,j ∩ TP ′s = tP ′s )
](rj=1) [
Pr(TCs,j = t
C
s,j ∩ TP
′
s = t
P ′
s )
Pr(TCs > t
C
s,j ∩ TP ′s = tP ′s )
](rj=0)
[
Pr(cs,j = 1) + Pr(cs,j = 0) Pr[(T
P
s > t
P
s,j ∩ TC
′
s = t
C′
s )|cs,j = 0]
Pr(cs,j = 1) + Pr(cs,j = 0) Pr[(TPs > t
P
s,j−1 ∩ TC′s = tC′s )|cs,j = 0]
](rj=1)
[
Pr(cs,j = 0) Pr[(T
P
s = t
P
s,j ∩ TC
′
s = t
C′
s )|cs,j = 0]
Pr(cs,j = 1) + Pr(cs,j = 0) Pr[(TPs > t
P
s,j−1 ∩ TC′s = tC′s )|cs,j = 0]
](rj=0)
,
where the first two lines calculate the likelihood contribution from pre-conflict peace observations,
the third line from conflict observations, and the last two lines from post-conflict peace observations.
We let cs,j be a function of covariates, XIs,j , and use a logit link function such that Pr(cs,j = 1) =(
1 + exp(−XIs,jβI)
)−1
. Therefore, we estimate four equations jointly: one for pre-conflict peace
duration, one for conflict duration, one for post-conflict peace duration, and one for immunity.
4. Monte Carlo Simulation
We demonstrate the performance of this model via Monte Carlo simulations. The analysis reveals
that the conventional survival model that ignores immunity status produces biased estimates of the
model parameters, even when there is no interdependence between peace and conflict processes.
It also shows that, when the processes underlying peace and conflict durations are nontrivially
correlated, the SPDDD model outperforms the conventional split-population model that estimates
peace and conflict durations separately.
A single round of our Monte Carlo simulation consists of 1, 000 hypothetical country-conflict
observations. Each country-conflict has at most three spells: pre-conflict peace spell, conflict spell,
and post-conflict peace spell. However, for those observations that are “immune” from conflict, we
only observe pre-conflict peace spells. To illustrate the performance of models that recognize the
interdependence between peace and conflict, we vary the value of θ from −0.9 (very high negative
interdependence between peace and conflict) to 0.9 (very high positive interdependence) with an
increment of 0.1. We perform 200 simulations for a given value of θ.
We assume four independent variables influence the process, x1, x2, x3, and x4. x1 influences the
duration of peace (both pre-conflict and post-conflict), x2 influences the duration of conflict, and x3
and x4 influence the latent immunity status. We generate 1, 000 values of these three variables, each
according to an independent uniform distribution over (−3, 3). We hold these variables constant
throughout the simulations.
Each round of simulation begins by generating a latent immunity status for each country-conflict
i, c∗i , according to the following specification:
c∗i = −x3 + x4 + ηi(17)
where ηi follows a logistic distribution. Those observations where c∗i > 0 are immune from conflict
and those where c∗i ≤ 0 are at risk of conflict. On average, 50% of the observations are immune.
We then generate two correlated random variables (νP , νC) for each of the 1, 000 observations
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according to a bivariate Normal distribution with a given correlation coefficient θ. To generate
peace and conflict durations, we transform νm,m ∈ {P,C} into a Weibull variate m using the
inverse transformation method such that m = − log(1 − Φ(νm)).8 Then, we generate peace and
conflict duration, tm, as
tP = exp(x1) + P
tC = exp(x2) + C .
For those observations that are immune from conflict (i.e., ci > 0), (1) the pre-conflict peace duration
is replaced with a larger value (i.e., the maximum value of tP in a given round of simulation), (2)
the pre-conflict peace is treated as right-censored, and (3) conflict and post-conflict peace durations
are dropped.
For each set of data, we estimate four sets of models: (1) a simple duration model of peace
(pre-conflict & post-conflict) and conflict, (2) a seemingly unrelated duration model of peace and
conflict, (3) split-population model of peace, and (4) our developed model, a SPDDD model of peace
and conflict. For all of the models, we specify the right-hand-side of the equations as follows:
preconflict peace = βP0 + βP1 ∗ x1 + βP2 ∗ x3(18)
conflict = βC0 + βC1 ∗ x2
postconflict peace = βPC0 + βPC1 ∗ x1 + βPC2 ∗ x3
immunity = βI0 + βI1 ∗ x3 + βI2 ∗ x4.
We are particularly interested in the estimates of βP2. As x3 only influences the immunity status
but not the peace duration in the data generating process, the true value of βP2 is 0. As we will
show below, however, models that ignore immunity status will produce estimates far from 0 even
in the absence of the interdependence between peace and conflict durations. On the other hand,
split-population models recover values very close to 0, on average. Furthermore, when there is a non
negligible amount of interdependence between the two duration processes, the seemingly unrelated
duration model outperforms the regular split-population duration models in terms of root mean
squared errors.
We first show the comparison between models with and without a split-population component.
Figure (3) shows the estimated values of βP2 from four models when there is no interdependence
between two durations (θ = 0). The density to the left of the figure (in light gray) shows the
estimates from the models without split-population component (simple duration model and seem-
ingly unrelated duration model).9 The density to the right of the figure (in dark gray) shows the
estimates from the models with a split-population component (simple split-population model and
seemingly unrelated duration model).10 We can see that both a simple duration and SPDDD mod-
els successfully recover the true value of βP2, whereas those without a split-population component
systematically underestimate it. This is because x3 negatively influences the immunity status in
the data generating process, as shown in equation (17). As non-immune observations have shorter
durations of peace than immune observations, models that ignore the immunity status mistakenly
attribute the negative effect of x3 on immunity to the negative effect of x3 on peace duration.
What would happen if there exists an interdependence between peace and conflict durations, as
our theoretical argument suggests? To illustrate the inefficiency of an approach that ignores the
8We assume that the duration dependence parameter α is equal to 1.
9Since the true value of θ in the data generating process is set equal to 0, the two models produce identical estimates,
as expected. We therefore combine the estimates from the two models (200 estimates from each) to simplify the
presentation.
10Again, estimates from the two models are identical to one another, so we combine the estimates from the two
models.
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Figure 3. Bias in Estimation
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Note: This figure displays the estimated coefficient for x3 in the pre-conflict peace duration, or βP2 in equation
(18). The density in light gray to the left of the figure shows the estimates from models without a split-population
component, whereas the density in dark gray to the right of the figure shows the estimates from models with a split
population component (standard SP model and seemingly unrelated duration model). The figure shows that the
estimates from models with a split-population component are centered around the true value of βP2(= 0) but those
from models without it are negatively biased.
interdependence, we compare our SPDDD model with the simple SP model that estimates peace
and conflict durations separately. Although both models successfully recover the true values, on
average, the simple SP model produces greater amount of estimation errors than does the SPDDD
model. Figure 4 shows the ratio of root mean squared error (RMSE) from the two models for
different values of interdependence between durations (θ). Specifically, it shows the RMSE from
the SP model divided by the RMSE from the SPDDD model where we vary the value of θ from
−0.9 (very high negative dependence) to 0.9 (very high positive dependence). When the two models
produce equivalent amount of estimation errors, the ratio is equal to 1. The ratio will be greater
than 1 when the SP model produces greater average error compared with the SPDDD model. As
we can see in the figure, as θ gets bigger in absolute values, the SP model produces much larger
RMSE compared with the SPDDD model.
5. An Empirical Application
We now turn to an empirical application of our approach to historical data on intrastate conflict
from 1946 through 2004. Our sample consists of all independent states as compiled by Gleditsch
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Figure 4. Efficiency in Estimation
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Note: This figure shows the ratio of root mean squared error (RMSE) for the simple SP model and the SPDDD
model across different values of interdependence between durations. The X-axis denotes the amount of
interdependence (θ, varying from −0.9 to 0.9), and the Y -axis shows the RMSE from the SP model divided by the
RMSE from the SPDDD model. We can see that, as θ moves away from 0, the SP model produces larger RMSE
compared with the SPDDD model.
and Ward (1999).11 During this period, 177 countries are recognized as independent states. We
limit our focus to 166 countries for which reliable information is available at some point during
this period.12 We use information from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) data sets to
code intrastate conflict.13 99 countries in our sample (59%) have experienced at least one intrastate
conflict during the observation span, whereas 67 countries (41%) have never experienced intrastate
conflict.
Peace and conflict spells. There are 222 unique conflict spells during the observation span. We
define conflict spells as a series of country-day observations where a country experiences at least one
ongoing intrastate conflict.14 The duration of a conflict spell is calculated as the number of days
elapsed since the onset of intrastate conflict until its termination or the end of the observation span,
December 31, 2004. In our data, there are 19 conflict spells (8.6%) where intrastate conflict was
still ongoing as of the end date of the observation span. These conflict spells are treated as right-
censored on December 31, 2004.15 Therefore the actual date of conflict termination is observed for
the remaining 203 non-censored conflict spells. The duration of conflict spells for the non-censored
11We used version 5.0 of the list of independent states, available online at http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/
statelist.html (accessed on May 1, 2013).
12In other words, we drop 11 countries for which information on country-specific characteristics is unavailable for the
entire period between 1946 and 2004. The excluded countries are: Barbados, Bhutan, Brunei, East Timor, Iceland,
Luxembourg, Maldives, North Yemen, Tibet, Yugoslavia, and Zanzibar.
13We used version 4 of the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset as well as the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset
v.2000-1, available online at http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/ (accessed on January 10, 2014).
14A country can experience more than one intrastate conflict on a given day. Rather than duplicating observations
for those country-days with multiple ongoing conflicts, we treat them as one observation.
15In fact, the UCDP data sets provide information up until December 31, 2012. We nevertheless choose December
31, 2004 as the censoring point because reliable information on many covariates is available only up to 2004.
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Figure 5. Duration of Peace and Civil Conflict, 1946–2004
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Note. The histogram to the left shows the duration of pre-conflict peace (in years) for the non-censored spells
(n = 222). The histogram in the middle shows the duration of intrastate conflict (in years) for the non-censored
conflict spells (n = 203). The histogram to the right shows the duration of post-conflict peace (in years) for the
non-censored spells (n = 129).
ones ranges from 1 day to 11,322 days (31 years).16 The histogram in the middle panel in Figure 5
shows the distribution of conflict duration for the 203 non-censored conflict spells.
For each of the terminated (i.e., non-censored) conflict spells, we calculate the duration of post-
conflict peace. A post-conflict peace spell is a series of country-day observations where a country is
not experiencing an intrastate conflict. It starts with the termination of an intrastate conflict. Since
there are 203 non-censored conflict spells, there are 203 post-conflict peace spells. The duration of
a post-conflict peace spell is calculated as the number of days elapsed since the termination date
of the preceding conflict spell until either one of the following three dates, whichever comes first:
(1) the date when another intrastate conflict begins in a country (129 spells or 63%); (2) the date
when the country lost its independence (2 spells or 1%); or (3) December 31, 2004 (72 spells or 35
%).17 The latter two types of post-conflict spells are treated as right-censored. The actual end date
of a post-conflict peace spell is observed for the 129 non-censored post-conflict peace process that
ended with a recurrence of conflict. The duration of post-conflict spells for the non-censored ones
ranges from 1 day to 12,694 days (35 years).18 The histogram in the right panel in Figure 5 shows
the distribution of post-conflict peace duration for the 129 non-censored spells.
Finally, we define pre-conflict peace spells for all the 222 conflict spells as well as for the 63
countries that did not experience any intrastate conflict during the observation span, yielding a
sample of 285 pre-conflict peace spells. The starting date of a pre-conflict peace spell is the latest
date of the following three dates: (1) the date of termination of the most recent intrastate conflict;
(2) the date of independence; or (3) January 1, 1946. The exact duration of a pre-conflict peace
spell can be determined only if we get to observe an onset of intrastate conflict. An intrastate
conflict breaks out in 222 pre-conflict peace spells (78%). For the remaining spells, we observe the
duration of peace up until December 31, 2004 (61 spells or 21%) or the date when the country lost its
independence (2 spells or 1%).19 We treat these spells as right-censored. For the 222 non-censored
16The longest conflict spell is observed for Guatemala (1965–1995).
17The two countries are South Vietnam (in 1975) and South Yemen (in 1990).
18The longest non-censored post-conflict peace spell is observed for Paraguay (1954–1989).
19The two countries are East Germany (in 1990) and Czechoslovakia (in 1992).
17
spells, the duration ranges from 1 day to 20,343 days (56 years).20 The histogram on the left side
in Figure 5 shows the distribution of pre-conflict peace duration for the non-censored spells.
As most of the covariates we introduce below change their values annually, we divide each of
the spells into multiple spell-year observations. There are 5,370 pre-conflict spell-years (285 pre-
conflict spells), 1,076 conflict spell-years (222 conflict spells), and 2,179 post-conflict spell-years (203
post-conflict spells) in the data.
Covariates. We test the empirical implications of our theoretical argument with a set of variables
measuring the characteristics of peace and conflict spells. Before turning to the specification for the
duration equations, we present the covariates in the immunity equation. Remember that we argued
that satisfied actors are unlikely to begin fighting and hence contribute to immune peace spells. We
argued that economic development is associated with satisfied actors and use GDP per capita and
controlling for Population to capture this idea. These variables are taken from Fearon and Laitin
(2003) and Bleaney and Dimico (2011). We also argued that anocracies are not able to address
the needs of unsatisfied actors (like stable democracies) nor can they induce the costs to violence
(like stable autocracies). We compose the X-polity score according to Vreeland (2008) taking the
original Polity case format data (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers, 2014) and include the squared term to
model the implied curvilinear relationship. Finally, we prepare a dummy variable 1+ excluded that
codes whether one or more ethnic groups are excluded from power, as we argued that policies that
create gaps between the underlying and actual power distribution are bound to create unsatisfied
actors. The data are taken from Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2010).
Theoretically, we are less interested in the specification of the duration equations. This is because
our theoretical argument focuses on the importance of unobserved factors. Thus, the main concern
is a well specified model that captures important factors contributed to pre-conflict, conflict, and
post-conflict duration.
For conflict spell-years, we use the following covariates. Multilateral conflict takes a value
of 1 for conflict spell-years where the government fights with more than one rebel groups, and 0
otherwise. Specifically, this variable is coded 1 when (1) the government fights more than one
intrastate conflicts in a given spell-year, or (2) the government fights more than one rebel groups
in one intrastate conflict in a given spell-year. We rely on information from the UCDP Armed
Conflict Dataset (the SideB variable) in coding this variable and want to capture the robust finding
that multiple actors are related to longer conflict duration (Cunningham, 2006). Conflict over
territory takes the value of 1 for conflict spell-years where the incompatible positions between
the government and rebel only concerns territory, and 0 otherwise. We use the Incompatibility
variable from the UCDP data set to code these variables, which pertains to the idea that territorial
aspects matter for conflict duration (Buhaug, Gates and Lujala, 2009). Intensity is also found to
be an important predictor of conflict duration (Regan, 2002) and is coded 1 for spell-years where
the levels of violence exceed the threshold of a civil war according to the UCDP data set. We
control for excluded ethnic groups (1+ excluded groups) in line with empirical support for the
notion that ethnic exclusion impacts on conflict duration (Wucherpfennig et al., 2012). Resources
are are frequently argued to affect conflict dynamics and we control for the occurrence of Diamonds
and onshore Oil. We also account for the political institutions (X-polity) and whether the conflict
has taken place during the Cold War.
For pre-conflict peace spells we introduce a similar set of covariates as in the immunity equation.
We do this because the current literature does not systematically distinguish between factors that
contribute to the immunity of conflict or the length of peace spell in at risk cases. However,
we argue that lootable resources can lead to a quicker onset of fighting if a country is at risk of
conflict. Hence, our model includes Diamonds and onshore Oil coded 1 for countries with such and
20The longest non-censored pre-conflict peace spell is observed for the United States of America (1946–2001).
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0 otherwise. More generally, the main explanatory variables that we introduce in the immunity and
pre-conflict duration equation are similar to the main explanatory variables in civil conflict onset
studies (Hegre et al., 2001; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010).
Finally, for post-conflict peace spells we especially focus on the outcome of the previous conflict.
It is frequently argued that especially government victories increase the duration of post-conflict
peace and empirical support for this argument seems to be robust (Toft, 2010). We use information
from the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset to code how the preceding conflict is terminated.
Government victory takes the value of 1 for post-conflict peace spells where the preceding conflict
ends in government victory, and 0 for non post-conflict peace spells and post-conflict peace spells
where the preceding conflict does not end in government victory. Rebel victory takes the value
of 1 for post-conflict peace spells where the preceding conflict ends in rebel victory, and 0 for non
post-conflict peace spells and post-conflict peace spells where the preceding conflict does not end
in rebel victory. Finally, Peace/ceasefire agreements takes the value of 1 for post-conflict peace
spells where the disputing parties ends the preceding conflict with either a peace agreement or a
ceasefire agreement. This leaves No/Low Intensity outcomes as the baseline category. We also
control for regime type (X-Polity, economic development (per capita GDP), Population, and
natural resources (Oil coded 1 for countries with on-shore oil wells and 0 otherwise, Diamond coded
1 for countries with diamond mines and 0 otherwise). Finally, we account for politically excluded
ethnic groups in the post-conflict peace period (1+ excluded groups).
We impute the missing values of the structural variables using the semiparametric imputation
technique proposed by Hoff (2007).
6. Empirical Results
Table 2 shows the estimated coefficients from four models.21 The first column reports the results
from a simple duration model of peace and conflict.22 These results correspond to the results
typically reported in conflict research that assumes as if the two processes were unrelated. The
second column reports the results from a seemingly unrelated duration model of peace and conflict
that recognizes the interdependence between peace and conflict, while still ignoring immunity status.
The third column reports the results from a simple split-population (SP) model that accounts for
immunity but ignores the interdependence. Finally, the fourth column reports the results from
our SPDDD model. We can assess the relative performance of these models by comparing Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) scores from each model, as the first model is nested in the second,
third and fourth models and the second and third models are each nested in the fourth model. We
can see that our SPDDD model yields the lowest AIC score of all the four models, suggesting that
it fits the data better than the other three models.
As we noted previously, two parametric specifications are used to describe the duration pro-
cesses of peace and conflict: Weibull parametrization and log-logistic parametrization. Weibull
parametrization is a simple and flexible specification where the underlying failure risk (i.e., hazard)
is allowed to increase, decrease, or be constant. One limitation of the Weibull specification, however,
is that it does not allow for non-monotonic change in hazard. Therefore, we also use log-logistic
parametrization that allows for non-monotonicity (but not a monotonic increase) in hazard. We
choose between Weibull and log-logistic parametrization based on fit statistics. Coefficients shown
in Table 2 are those with Weibull parametrization.23
21Coefficients for the intercept are omitted for brevity.
22We obtained the results for the first column by estimating a model while assuming there is no correlation between
peace and conflict. Such “joint but independent” estimation is mathematically equivalent to estimating separate
models for peace and conflict duration.
23The log-logistic model generates Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) score of 9880, whereas AIC for the Weibull
model is 9868. We thus chose Weibull–Weibull specification as it generates the lower AIC score.
19
Table 2. Results from Four Different Models
Simple SUD SP SPDDD
Pre-Conflict Peace Duration
Constant 9.63 9.62 9.50 9.43
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Per capita GDP (logged) 0.21 0.22 0.15 0.15
(0.02) (0.02) (0.12) (0.11)
X-Polity −0.06 −0.05 −0.05 −0.04
(0.03) (0.04) (0.09) (0.10)
X-Polity2 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.11)
Population (logged) −0.27 −0.27 −0.26 −0.25
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Diamonds −0.20 −0.19 −0.20 −0.18
(0.40) (0.42) (0.37) (0.43)
Oil −0.27 −0.27 −0.26 −0.27
(0.21) (0.20) (0.26) (0.24)
There exist 1+ excluded groups −0.53 −0.52 0.30 0.31
(0.03) (0.04) (0.26) (0.24)
log(α) (duration dependence) −0.25 −0.25 −0.17 −0.16
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Conflict Duration
Constant 4.30 4.04 4.30 3.61
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04)
Per capita GDP (logged) −0.11 −0.10 −0.11 −0.07
(0.56) (0.60) (0.56) (0.72)
Population (logged) 0.22 0.24 0.22 0.27
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03)
Multilateral conflict 1.28 1.26 1.28 1.23
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Intensity 0.83 0.82 0.83 0.80
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Conflict over territory 0.66 0.62 0.66 0.57
(0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.09)
X-Polity 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07
(0.13) (0.11) (0.13) (0.10)
X-Polity2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.80) (0.90) (0.80) (0.88)
Diamonds −0.17 −0.14 −0.17 −0.10
(0.66) (0.72) (0.66) (0.80)
Oil −0.23 −0.26 −0.23 −0.29
(0.49) (0.45) (0.49) (0.39)
Cold War 0.25 0.28 0.25 0.34
(0.41) (0.35) (0.41) (0.27)
There exist 1+ excluded groups 0.70 0.72 0.70 0.61
(0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.13)
log(α) (duration dependence) −0.68 −0.68 −0.68 −0.68
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Post-Conflict Peace Duration
Constant 5.94 5.94 7.10 7.03
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Per capita GDP (logged) 0.47 0.47 0.27 0.25
(0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.08)
Rebel victory 0.96 0.98 0.57 0.59
(0.01) (0.01) (0.13) (0.11)
Government victory −0.22 −0.14 −0.23 −0.11
(0.55) (0.71) (0.56) (0.77)
Peace Agreement 0.40 0.40 0.34 0.36
(0.21) (0.21) (0.29) (0.26)
Conflict over territory −0.45 −0.46 −0.58 −0.59
(0.08) (0.08) (0.02) (0.02)
Population (logged) −0.04 −0.04 −0.11 −0.10
(0.69) (0.66) (0.25) (0.27)
X-Polity −0.02 −0.02 0.00 0.00
(0.49) (0.48) (0.96) (0.95)
X-Polity2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.20) (0.20) (0.28) (0.37)
Diamonds −0.17 −0.18 −0.39 −0.39
(0.61) (0.60) (0.22) (0.21)
Oil −0.64 −0.62 −0.55 −0.54
(0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.08)
There exist 1+ excluded groups −0.71 −0.71 0.43 0.49
(0.03) (0.03) (0.40) (0.31)
log(α) (duration dependence) −0.22 −0.22 −0.11 −0.11
(0.00) (0.00) (0.19) (0.17)
Immunity
Constant −5.47 −5.08
(0.08) (0.07)
There exist 1+ excluded groups −2.83 −2.68
(0.00) (0.00)
Per capita GDP (logged) 0.55 0.55
(0.03) (0.02)
X-Polity −0.15 −0.14
(0.03) (0.03)
X-Polity2 0.08 0.08
(0.00) (0.00)
Population −0.14 −0.18
(0.56) (0.38)
tanh−1(θ) (interdependence) −0.05 −0.10
(0.46) (0.13)
Log-likelihood 4907 4907 4893 4892
AIC 9884 9886 9869 9868
p-values (two-tailed test) in parentheses.
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Since the models have (at most) four equations, there are four sets of coefficients. The first
three panels show the estimated parameters for pre-conflict peace duration, conflict duration, and
post-conflict peace duration. The coefficients are represented in the accelerated failure time metric;
positive estimates are associated with longer duration. Estimates for duration dependence param-
eters, α, are shown at the bottom of each panel.24 The fourth panel shows the estimates for the
immunity equation for models with a split-population component. Variables with positive estimates
are associated with higher likelihood that the country is immune from conflict. Finally, estimates
for the correlation parameter θ, are shown in the fifth panel of the table.25
We can see that the estimated correlation parameter tanh−1(θ) is negative, generating θ = −0.1
in our SPDDD model. This suggests that peace duration and conflict duration are negatively corre-
lated, conditional on the covariates and our model specifications. In other words, conflicts following
longer (shorter) peace tends to be shorter (longer) and post-conflict peace following longer (shorter)
conflict tends to be shorter (longer). This finding is consistent with our theoretical expectation.
The estimated log(α) for conflict spells is negative, generating α < 1. This suggests that the risk
of conflict termination is decreasing over time, other things being equal. The estimated log(α) for
pre-conflict and post-conflict peace spells are both negative but with larger standard errors for post-
conflict peace periods in the SPDDD model. This result implies that we have evidence to suggest
that the conditional risk of conflict onset given “non-immunity” is decreasing over time, controlling
for the covariates and the interdependence of conflict and peace duration.
Some striking differences are observed between models with and without a split-population com-
ponent. As we show with Monte Carlo simulations, models that ignore immunity status underes-
timate (overestimate) the effect of covariates that negatively (positively) influence immunity. For
example, SP and SPDDD models suggest that the presence of excluded ethnic groups (1) makes a
country less likely to be immune from conflict, but (2) does not necessarily influence post-conflict
peace duration (the p-values of excluded groups increase in the SP and SPDDD models). As we
discussed in the theoretical section, factors such as the absence of ethnic groups excluded from a
country’s political process represent the absence of unsatisfied actors willing to fight. Furthermore,
we can see that 1+ excluded groups, GDP per capita and X-Polity have the expected effects on
immunity from conflict. Richer countries are less likely to experience any conflict, while anocracies
and countries with excluded ethnic groups are more likely to be at risk of conflict.
To demonstrate the better fit of our proposed model, we calculate the expected duration for
uncensored peace and conflict spells according to our SPDDD model and the simple duration model.
For our sample, the SPDDD model yielded predicted values closer to the observed values 60 % of the
time (330 out of 554 uncensored spells). Moreover, the deviation of prediction from the observed
duration is much smaller for the SPDDD model than for the simple model. Figure 6 illustrates
this point. In each panel, plotted to the left (in gray lines) are estimates from the simple model,
whereas plotted to the right are estimates from the SPDDDmodel. The left panel shows the absolute
deviation of predicted duration from the observed duration for all non-censored spells in our dataset.
The Y-axis shows the observed duration, and the X-axis shows the absolute difference between the
observed and predicted duration from the two model. We can see that the simple model often yields
deviation as large as 50 years, whereas the SPDDD model never yields deviation greater than 50
years and seldom yields deviation as large as 25 years. The right panel of the Figure illustrates
the advantage of SPDDD model in terms of the difference in prediction error between the SPDDD
model and the simple model. Lines to the left (in gray) show the absolute deviation (observed -
24Note that α is re-parameterized as log(α). This is necessary because the duration dependence α can only take
positive values.
25Note that θ is re-parameterized as tanh−1(θ). This is necessary because the correlation θ is only defined between
−1 and 1.
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Figure 6. In-sample prediction assessment
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Note. This figure compares model fit and in-sample prediction between simple Weibull model and the SPDDD
model. The left panel shows the absolute deviation of the predicted duration for the two models, whereas the right
panel shows the difference in absolute deviation. In each panel, gray lines (plotted to the left) refer to Simple model
whereas black lines (plotted to the right) refer to the SPDDD model.
predicted) from the simple model minus the absolute deviation from the SPDDD model for the
cases where SPDDD performs better than the simple. Similarly, the lines to the right (in black)
show the absolute deviation (observed - predicted) from the SPDDD model minus the absolute
deviation from the simple model for the cases where the simple model performs better than the
SPDDD model. We can see clearly that the SPDDD model performs better than the simple model
most of the times and by a great extent. 26
7. Conclusion
This might be the end to this article, but it is hopefully the beginning of further research to
theoretically and empirically embrace the notion that we need to treat pre-conflict peace duration,
conflict duration, and post-conflict peace duration as interdependent processes. Our main argument
is that we should account for the unobserved status of immunity from conflict as well as the un-
observed factors that generate an interdependence between pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict
processes.
Herein, we introduced an estimation approach that captures important elements of our theoret-
ical argument. Our Monte Carlo simulations confirm that a failure to account for the unobserved
immunity and/or interdependence leads to biased inferences. Our empirical results also demon-
strate that a model that corrects for these two inferential problems provides a better model fit. Our
proposed model not only fits the data better but also reveals that some of the covariates that were
thought to influence peace duration also influence the immunity from conflict. In fact, some esti-
mates, especially the political exclusion of ethnic groups, become less precise in the peace duration
26Superior model fit can also be demonstrated by comparing RMSE estimates for the two models. RMSE estimates
from the SPDDD model are 5332 (days) for the pre-conflict peace process (as opposed to 10917 for the simple model),
3436 for the post-conflict process (as opposed to 7145 for the simple model), and 3104 for the conflict process (as
opposed to 3121 for the simple model).
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equations once we account for the possible immunity of cases. While ethnic exclusion consistently
impacts on conflict duration (Wucherpfennig et al., 2012) (even though in the SPDDD model less
precise (p-value=0.13)), its effect is less certain in regard to pre- (p-value=0.24) or post-conflict
peace duration (p-value=0.31). Similar observations can be made for GDP per capita. Of course,
we are cautious about a final the interpretation of these results as further research has to provide
insights into whether the underlying assumption of the split-population model that the immunity
process is uncorrelated with the duration processes needs to be relaxed.
A further important insight of our work is that while peace and conflict durations seem to be
related through unobserved factors, the main predictive improvement of our empirical model comes
from modelling whether or not countries are immune from initial or further conflict. According to our
theoretical argument, this would imply that once we account for whether actors are unsatisfied with
the status quo, we can improve the actual duration modelling. In fact going back to our empirical
model, there is evidence that once we model the immunity of cases, we also get more precise estimates
for the interdependence between durations (θ p-value SUD=0.46; θ p-value SPDDD=0.13) and a
decrease in the AIC score (SUD=9886; SPDDD= 9868). This again highlights the importance of
modelling the theoretically implied data generating process as closely as possible. We believe that
our empirical results support the case for further research focusing on both the interdependent
nature of durations and the immunity of certain cases from conflict.
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